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We examine whether and how auditors respond to audit risks arising from secrecy culture when 
making audit opinions decisions. Using a sample of international Big N auditors from 33 
countries, we find strong and robust evidence that auditors are more likely to issue modified 
audit opinions to clients domiciled in countries with a strong secrecy culture. In addition, we 
find that the association between secrecy culture and auditors’ propensity to issue modified 
audit opinions is less pronounced in countries with strong investor protection than that in 
countries with weak investor protection.  
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Culture has been defined as a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes one 
group of people from another (Hofstede and Bond 1988). These values and beliefs are transmitted 
relatively unchanged from generation to generation (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006). Culture 
influences human beings’ behavior and in turn has economic consequences1. Accountants have a 
strong interest in understanding the role of culture in various financial reporting practices. Gray 
(1988) was among the first authors to develop a framework for a country-level accounting 
subculture based on Hofstede (1980). Among various accounting subcultures 2 , Gray (1988) 
identifies secrecy culture as an important factor associated with disclosure risk (e.g., Gray 1988; 
Gray and Vint 1995; Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo 2008; Wingate 1997). One question naturally 
arising from previous studies is whether and how auditors respond to the reporting risks inherent 
in secrecy culture. We attempt to shed some light on this issue by examining audit opinion decision.  
One important responsibility of the accounting profession is to issue audit opinion (Choi 
and Jeter 1992). An auditor is required to express opinions on whether financial reporting is 
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and a modified 
                                                     
1  The literature provides ample evidence that culture has economic consequences (see e.g., Adler 1997; Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales 2006; Hofstede 1980; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta 2004; Ralston, Holt, 
Terpstra, and Cheng 1997; Salter and Niswander 1995; Stulz and Williamson 2003). 
2  Gray (1988) constructs four dimensions of subcultures in the accountancy profession: professionalism versus 
statutory control, uniformity versus flexibility, conservatism versus optimism, and secrecy versus transparency. 
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audit opinion is issued when a client has misstatements arising from GAAP violations. Issuing 
opinion is one of the most significant tools for communicating with financial information users. 
Indeed, audit opinions, particularly modified audit opinions, are associated with various economic 
outcomes for client firms3. Despite the importance of audit opinions in capital markets, very few 
studies examine the determinants of audit opinions in an international context. In addition, 
although numerous behavioral studies show that national culture significantly influences auditors’ 
judgments and decision-making (see Nolder and Riley 2013), systematic studies based on large 
samples of archival data are scant due to data limitations4 . We are motivated to advance our 
understanding of auditor’s opinion decision by examining the culture effect in an international 
context. We believe that audit opinions are observable outcomes of audits directly under the 
auditors’ influence and control and thus could overcome the limitations and provide additional 
insights beyond prior behavioral studies. 
Auditors are expected to express independent opinions. Failure to report a modified audit 
opinion when one is warranted indicates an egregious audit failure, which erodes auditor reputation 
                                                     
3 A modified audit opinion sends a signal to the market that financial reporting is unreliable and thereby affects 
investors’ responses to the earnings number. Previous studies show that modified audit opinions are associated with 
lower earnings response coefficients (ERCs) (e.g., Choi and Jeter 1992), negative stock returns (Chen, Su, and Zhao 
2000), and unfavorable loan terms (Chen, He, Ma, and Stice 2015).  
4 Prior behavioral studies are normally based on a small number of countries. One notable limitation using archival 
data is that it is difficult to find observable outcomes of auditors’ behavior. This limitation suggests that inferences 
from proxies based on archival data are likely to be weak. 
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capital and results in litigation costs (DeFond and Zhang 2014). To safeguard valuable reputation 
capital and avoid litigation risks, auditors act conservatively and lower the threshold for issuing 
modified audit opinions to clients with high misstatement risk (Francis and Krisnan 1999, 2002; 
Geiger and Raghunannda 2002; Geiger, Raghunannda, and Rama 2005) 5 . A secrecy culture 
constitutes one misstatement risk because managers embedded in such a culture tend to avoid 
hiring competent auditors (Hope et al. 2008), use opaque disclosure policies (Gray and Vint 1995; 
Wingate 1997), and aggressively use discretionary accruals (Braun and Rodriguez 2008). 
Responding to the misstatement risks in a secrecy culture, auditors are likely to issue modified 
audit opinions to the clients domiciled in such culture to protect their reputation and reduce 
litigation risks (Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Reynolds and Francis 2000). In the international 
setting, although litigation risks vary in different countries, audit failure in one country is likely to 
result in reputation loss in other countries (Cahan, Emanuel, and Sun 2009). Drawing on the 
literature, we hypothesize that auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients 
domiciled in societies that exhibit a strong secrecy culture. 
We also recognize that social norms never exist in a vacuum and thus consider the 
moderating effect of investor protection on the relationship between secrecy culture and modified 
                                                     
5 For example, with increased risk exposure after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was implemented in 2002, the probability 
of issuing going concern opinions increased (e.g., Geiger et al. 2005) in the U.S. 
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audit opinions. For example, prior study shows how interplay between informal and formal 
institutions affects financial reporting practices (e.g., Han, Kang, Salter, and Yoo 2010). We argue 
that investor protection has two competing effects on auditor opinion decision and thus its 
moderating effect is not clear. On the one hand, auditors are more conservative under strict investor 
protection regimes (Chen, Sun, and Wu 2010; Fung, Zhou, and Zhu 2016) and thus are more likely 
to issue modified audit opinions to reduce litigation and reputation loss risks (e.g. Francis and 
Krisnan 1999, 2002). On the other hand, strong formal institutions deter managers from adopting 
opaque disclosure policies and reporting poor quality financial statements, leading to lower 
misstatement risks (e.g. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Fung, Su, and Gul 2013). This argument 
suggests insiders’ tendency to withhold information in a secrecy culture is reduced under strong 
investor protection regimes and thus auditor’s propensity of issuing modified opinions decreases. 
Extending the first research question, our second empirical question therefore is how investor 
protection moderates the relationship between secrecy culture and the propensity of issuing 
modified opinions. 
We empirically examine the aforementioned research questions using an international 
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sample of Big N auditors6 for three main reasons7. First, compared to non-Big N auditors, Big N 
auditors are less likely to be affected by local culture (Soeters and Schreuder 1988) and thus are 
more objective in viewing reporting risks inherent in that culture. Big N auditors therefore provide 
a better setting to examine these issues than non-Big N auditors. Second, Big N auditors have 
greater capacity and stronger incentives than non-Big N auditors to use various mechanisms to 
ensure that their audits are of consistently high quality across different jurisdictions (Francis and 
Wang 2008; Toffler 2003). Therefore, reliable inferences can be drawn from the analyses based on 
data from Big N auditors because the quality of services rendered by these auditors worldwide is 
consistent8. Last, Big N auditors are the dominant players in global audit markets (Francis, Michas, 
and Seavey 2013) and they influence audit practices worldwide (Humphrey, Loft, and Woods 
2009). As a result, findings based on Big N auditors also provide implications for other auditors. 
Using a sample of audits conducted in 33 countries from 1994 to 2012, we show that 
                                                     
6 In our sample period 1994–2012, the Big N auditors mainly refer to the Big 4 auditors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG). We also use Big 5 auditors (adding Arthur Andersen) to 
examine our research questions and yield similar results. 
7  Although we recognize the potential problems of including non-Big N auditors, we perform an analysis based on a 
sample consisting of both Big N and non-Big N auditors. Consistent with the findings shown in this paper, the results 
show that auditors (including Big N and non-Big N auditors) are more likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients 
located in a secrecy culture, and the results are more pronounced for Big N auditors. Due to the focus of our paper, 
we do not report the results here. 
8 Previous studies also use Big N auditor firms as testing sample to control for auditor capacity and brand name, two 
factors that significantly influence auditor behavior (see DeFond and Zhang 2014 for discussions).   
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auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients domiciled in countries with a 
strong secrecy culture9, confirming secrecy hypothesis (Gray 1988). Further analyses show that 
such association is less pronounced in countries with strong investor protection than in those with 
weak investor protection, suggesting that the misstatement risk in secrecy culture is mitigated by 
formal institutions pertaining to investor protection. We conduct additional tests by restricting our 
analyses to samples of financially distressed firms. This restriction is based on previous findings 
(e.g., DeFond, Raghunannda, and Subramanyam 2002) that financially distressed firms have high 
reporting risks and thus are more likely to receive modified audit opinions. Our results do not 
change with the use of financially distressed firm samples. Our analyses also reveal that the 
positive relationship between secrecy culture and auditors’ propensity to issue modified audit 
opinions still exists in multinational firms, consistent with the home-country institution effect 
documented in previous studies (e.g., Shi, Magnan, and Kim 2012). We conduct some additional 
analyses to exclude some alternative explanations, e.g. manager’s reporting incentives. We find 
that our results are not driven by managers’ reporting incentives and thus further support the culture 
explanation of modified audit opinions. Complementing with prior studies linking secrecy culture 
and actual reporting quality (Braun and Rodriguez 2008; Gray and Vint 1995; Wingate 1997), our 
                                                     
9 In this study, we test our hypotheses mainly using Big 4 auditors to be consistent with the literature (e.g., Hope et 
al. 2008). However, our results are quantitatively similar using Big 5 auditors 
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result that controls for earnings quality also suggests that auditors perceive secrecy culture as one 
important risk factor (italic emphasis added). Finally, our findings stand up to a battery of 
robustness checks. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to examine how auditors respond to misstatement risks that are 
inherent in culture based on large scale archival data. Our study thus extends the culture and 
accounting literature (e.g., Gray 1988; Gray and Vint 1995; Han et al. 2010; Hope 2003; Hope et 
al. 2008; Wingate 1997) and provides insights into the role of culture in audit practices. One 
implication is that a secrecy culture is an important audit risk factor that auditors should take into 
account. Because audit opinions are associated with economic consequences in financial markets, 
our research could be further extended to understand how culture affects the response of investors 
to audit opinions. 
Second, our study suggests the joint effect of formal and informal institutions on audits. 
Previous studies (e.g., Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2008; Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn 2002) 
document that auditors consider formal institutions, such as investor protection, as risk factors 
when they perform audits. Our study complements and extends previous studies by showing the 
joint effect of formal and informal institutions in affecting audits. One implication is that 
practitioners should consider both formal and informal institutions when perform audits. 
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Finally, the issue of whether and how auditors should respond to reporting risks that are 
inherent in secrecy culture is also of interest to regulators. For example, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) suggests that “local business practices and cultural norms 
in emerging markets may differ from those in more developed markets, and auditors should be 
alert to the effect of these differences on the risks of material misstatement” (PCAOB 2011). Our 
study sheds some light on this issue and thus has some implications for regulators. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature 
and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we outline the research design and describe the data 
collection. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Secrecy Culture and Accounting/Auditing Practices 
Culture distinguishes one group of people from another (Hofstede and Bond 1988). It 
shapes people’s values, which consequently influence their attitudes and, ultimately, their behavior 
(Adler 1997). After surveying more than 30 countries, Hofstede (1980) empirically constructs four 
cultural indices, namely, collectivism/individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and 
masculinity, to measure cultural dimensions. Based on Hofstede (1980), a large number of 
subsequent studies examine the effect of culture on various business practices. Gray (1988) is one 
of the early works that introduced Hofstede (1980) into the accounting profession. Among four 
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accounting subcultures, Gray (1988) highlights the importance of the opposing dimensions of 
secrecy and transparency. He contends that secrecy is positively related to uncertainty avoidance 
and power distance and negatively related to individualism and, in secretive societies, people tend 
to restrict information within insiders. Gray and Vint (1995) use survey data to demonstrate that 
accounting disclosure is positively associated with individualism and negatively associated with 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Similarly, cross-country studies (e.g., Han et al. 2010; 
Hope 2003; Wingate 1997) report that individualism and uncertainty avoidance both contribute to 
explain the variations of disclosure levels of a firm. Using a sample from China, Chan, Lin, and 
Mo (2003) report that greater power distance is positively associated with larger accounting errors. 
Hope et al. (2008) develop a composite measure of secrecy culture and document that companies 
in countries with high secrecy indices are less likely to choose Big N auditors, although this effect 
is less pronounced for multinational firms which are less affected by local culture. Braun and 
Rodriguez (2008) find a significantly negative association between secrecy culture and earnings 
quality proxied by abnormal accruals. Taken together, the evidence shows that firms in a secrecy 
culture have great misstatement risks. 
 
Secrecy Culture and Audit Opinions 
The purpose of an audit is to express opinions on the fairness with which financial 
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statements “present, in all material respects, financial position, results of operations, and its cash 
flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” (AICPA 1972). Unless 
financial statements are presented in accordance with GAAPs, clients are likely to receive the 
following different types of modified audit opinions: explanatory language added to the auditor’s 
standard report, qualified opinions, adverse opinions, and disclaimers of opinion (AICPA 1988, 
SAS No. 58)10. PCAOB AU 508 adopted the existing reporting standards (including SAS No. 58) 
with some modifications and expansions (PCAOB 2003). In general, the standards require an 
auditor to issue qualified or adverse opinions when misstatements due to GAAP violations occur. 
In spirit with the standards, Francis and Krishnan (1999) show that Big 4 auditors in U.S. are more 
likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients with more within-GAAP manipulations proxied 
by abnormal accruals. 
Drawn on prior literature, we argue that firms in a secrecy culture have greater 
misstatement risks and thus are more likely to receive modified audit opinions. Managers in a 
secrecy culture tend to restrict information within insiders by adopting opaque disclosure policies 
(Gray and Vint 1995; Wingate 1997), using discretionary accruals opportunistically (Braun and 
Rodriguez 2008), and hiring less competent auditors (Hope et al. 2008). As a result, a secrecy 
                                                     
10 International audit standards have similar classifications albeit with subtle differences (see International Standard 
on Auditing 705, IFAC 2009). 
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culture increases audit risks because there is a high possibility that material information will be 
withheld (Hope et al. 2008). In response to the misstatement risks inherent in a secrecy culture, we 
argue that auditors will follow auditing standards and issue modified audit opinions to clients 
embedded in a secrecy culture. The risks of litigation and reputation loss also force auditors to 
issue modified audit opinions to such clients. Carcello and Plamrose (1994) argue that issuing 
modified audit opinions helps audit firms protect their reputation and reduces the likelihood of 
being sued (and thus reduces litigation costs) if subsequent bankruptcy occurs. Other studies show 
that auditors lower the threshold for issuing modified audit opinions to compensate for the 
exposure to misstatement risks (Francis and Krisnan 1999, 2002; Geiger and Raghunannda 2002; 
Geiger et al. 2005). In recognition of the reporting risks inherent in a secrecy culture, auditors are 
more likely to issue modified audit opinions to reduce the risks of litigation and reputation loss. 
Based on the above arguments, we formally state our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1:  Auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients domiciled in a secrecy 
culture. 
 
Although we primarily investigate the effect of secrecy culture on modified audit opinions, 
we also recognize that social norms such as culture never exist in a vacuum. Previous studies find 
a joint effect of formal and informal institutions on financial reporting practices (Han et al. 2010). 
In a similar vein, we argue that the interplay between informal and formal institutions affects 
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auditors’ behavior. On the one hand, strong investor protection regimes force auditors to be more 
conservative (Chen et al. 2010; Fung, et al. 2016) and thus they are more likely to issue modified 
audit opinions because auditors are exposed to high litigation and reputation loss risks when 
investors are well protected. On the other hand, investor protection affects managers’ financial 
reporting practices. For example, prior studies (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Fung et al. 2013) show that 
companies in countries with strong formal institutions provide more transparent disclosures and 
have higher earnings quality than those in countries with weak formal institutions. This view 
predicts that clients’ tendency to withhold information in a secrecy culture is reduced under strong 
investor protection regimes and thus the propensity of issuing modified opinions decreases. 
Therefore, the role of investor protection in moderating the relationship between secrecy culture 
and the probability of issuing modified opinions becomes an empirical question. We therefore state 
our second hypothesis (in a null form) as follows. 
H2: The effect of secrecy culture on modified audit opinions does not vary with investor 
protection. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Measurement of Key Variables 
Modified audit opinion (MAO) 
We use a dummy variable to indicate modified audit opinion (MAO), coded 0 for clean and 
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1 for modified audit opinion. We extract audit opinion data from COMPUSTAT Global, in which 
modified audit opinions include qualified opinion, unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph, 
disclaimer of opinion (going-concern opinion), and adverse opinion11. Modified audit opinions are 
issued based on many different grounds and the requirements to issue modified opinions vary 
across jurisdictions12. The proportion of firms that receive modified audit opinions is surprisingly 
high for some countries included in our test sample (for example, Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey, 
see Table 1 for details). To assess the validity of MAO in international setting, we trace back to the 
source documents of the audit reports13. We randomly select audit reports from at least three firms 
in our sample countries. Based on a manual examination of the audit reports, we find that the 
modified audit opinions included in our sample are reasonably good indications of auditors’ 
reservations about issuing a clean report. We believe that the issuance of modified audit opinions 
generally alerts financial information users to auditors’ concerns about their clients’ compliance 
issues despite the different rules for issuing modified audit opinions around the world. As a 
robustness check, we repeat our analyses based on a reduced sample (excluding countries with 
                                                     
11 We note that the terminology of each audit opinion may differ in different jurisdictions due to different audit 
standards and practices. 
12 Modified audit opinions can be issued based on (but not limited to) the following grounds: a significant change in 
accounting policy, a justifiable deviation from local financial reporting practice, significant disagreement with the 
client on the choice of accounting policies or the methods of application, or a disclaimer of opinion. 
13 We obtain the audit reports from company website and morningstar.  
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extremely high average MAO) and obtain similar results. 
Secrecy culture (SEC) 
Gray (1988) defines secrecy culture as “a preference for confidentiality and the restriction 
of disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely involved with its 
management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and publicly accountable 
approach.” Despite the popularity of this definition, secrecy measurement remains challenging 
until recently. Gray (1988) conceptually proposes that cultural secrecy is positively related to 
uncertainty avoidance and power distance and negatively related to individualism. Hope et al. 
(2008) is the first study to provide a novel measure of secrecy culture that translates secrecy (Gray 
1988) into an empirical construct using Hofstede (1980). In this study, we follow Hope et al. (2008) 
and measure secrecy14 (SEC) as 
SEC = UA + PDI − IDV 
       where UA is the uncertainty avoidance index, PDI is the power distance index, and IDV is the 
individualism index. These cultural indices are adopted from Hofstede (2001) to capture cultural 
traits in our sample period. Although we use this measure of secrecy in our main analyses, we also 
supplement the main results with other measures of secrecy suggested by Hope et al. (2008) in 
robustness tests. 
                                                     




Empirical Model  
Following the literature (Chen, et al. 2010; Chen, et al. 2013; DeFond, et al. 2002; Fung 
et al. 2016; Lennox and Li 2012; Reynolds and Francis 2000), we adopt the following 
specification to test our first hypothesis: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀𝐴𝑂 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐸𝐶 + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + Industry Effects + Year Effects + ε
𝑛
𝑖=2     (1) 
       
     MAO is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an auditor issues a modified audit opinion to the 
client and 0 otherwise. SEC is cultural secrecy as defined in the previous section. In addition to 
SEC, we control for other factors that capture the effect of client-level characteristics on an 
auditor’s decision to issue an opinion. We control for lag modified audit opinions (LMAO) to 
correct time series correlation. We use the natural logarithm of the client’s total assets to measure 
firm size. Large firms are more likely than small firms to avoid bankruptcy (Reynolds and Francis 
2000) and thus are less likely to receive modified audit opinions. Operating risks are important 
factors that affect the propensity of auditors to issue modified audit opinions. Firms with high 
illiquid assets (low QUICK or high ARINV), low operation efficiency (TURNOVER), and high debt 
ratios (LEV) are associated with high financial risks, leading to greater likelihood of receiving 
modified audit opinions. Loss firms (LOSS) have large operating risks and thus are more likely to 
receive MAO. The stock market performance of firms also affects the propensity of auditors to 
issue modified audit opinions (DeFond et al. 2002). In our model, we also control for stock market 
performance and risk factors, such as stock market systematic risk (BETA), stock return over the 
fiscal year (RET), and unsystematic risk (STDRET). Greater risks (high BETA and STDRET, low 
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RET) are positively correlate with the issuance of modified audit opinions (Chen et al. 2010; 
DeFond et al. 2002). GDP is controlled to address the effect of the economic development of a 
given country. We also control for country-level formal institutions such as common law (UKLAW) 
and anti-director provisions (ANTIDIR). We further include year and industry fixed effects in our 
main empirical models. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for the potential 
variations at firm-level. 
Our second hypothesis concerns the joint effect of formal and informal institutions on audit 
opinion. In the present study, we consider different dimensions of investor protection (GOV) 
documented by previous studies, including law and/or provisions-related indices and resource-
based measures. In particular, we consider anti-director provisions (ANTIDIR), auditors’ liability 
(LITSTD), disclosure requirement (DISREQ), and the availability of enforcement team 
(SECSTAFF) as important measures of formal institutions that drive auditors to provide effective 
audits (Francis and Wang 2008; Gul et al. 2013; and Jackson and Roe 2009). These four indices 
include both regulations or provisions-based measures and resource-based measures and therefore 
capture investor protection from different perspectives. Table 2 shows that these four measures of 
investor protection are highly correlated. To identify the commonalities of various investor 
protection measures in this study, we use the factor analysis method (Bushman et al. 2004) to 
construct a composite measure of investor protection. We perform a principal factor analysis using 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedures on the four measures to generate a proxy for 
the unobserved investor protection construct. The procedure returns only one factor that has an 
Eigenvalue greater than 1. We then construct a composite index by combing the measures using 
the scoring coefficients and label the composite investor protection index INVPRO. We report the 
statistics of INVPRO in Table 1. Using INVPRO as one of our investor protection measures, we 
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test our second hypothesis using the following specification. 




                                       +Industry Effects + Year Effects + ε                                                    (2)                                         
GOV includes the investor protection indices ANTIDIR, LITSTD, DISREQ, SECSTAFF, 
and INVPRO, and SEC*GOV is an array of interaction terms between SEC and GOV. All other 
variables are defined in Equation (1). A significantly negative (positive) coefficient of SEC*GOV 
suggests that the effect of SEC on MAO is weakened (strengthened) by investor protection. 
In the above research designs, we examine our hypotheses based on a full sample for the 
sake of generalization. However, this approach may lead to sample bias because auditors’ issuance 
of non-clean reports is conditional on clients’ financial status. Following past studies (e.g., DeFond 
et al.2002; Geiger and Rama, 2003; Li, 2009; Reynolds and Francis, 2000), we also examine our 
hypotheses using a sample consisting of financially distressed firms (i.e., a sample of client firms 
with negative earnings) to further bolster our findings. 
 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
We obtain data from different sources. Auditor and financial data are obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT Global Industrial and Commercial file from 1994 to 2012. We extract cultural 
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indices data from Hofstede (2001) to construct secrecy culture measure. We obtain investor 
protection data from La Porta et al. (1998), La Porta et al. (2006), and Jackson and Roe (2009). 
Macro-economic data is sourced from World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the 
World Bank. Data are included in our sample based on the following criteria: (1) firm-year 
observations without any missing values for dependent and independent variables that are 
specified in the empirical models; (2) data from non-financial institutions and non-utility firms; (3) 
firms audited by Big 4 auditing firms15; and (4) observations from countries other than Japan, 
South Korea, India, and Pakistan, as suggested by Francis and Wang (2008) 16 . The above 
procedures result in 49,697 observations in 33 countries from 1994 to 2012. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all country-level and firm-level variables used 
in our study. Panel A displays the by-country mean value of each key variable. The U.K. has the 
largest sample size among all of the countries in our sample17. The mean MAO is lower in Anglo-
Saxon countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the U.K. than in other countries. The large 
differences between countries can be explained by differences in their legal systems and 
                                                     
15 We also use Heckman model to correct potential selection bias problem. The untabulated results show that our 
results are unaffected by selection problems. 
16 Following Francis and Wang (2008), we exclude observations from Japan, South Korea, India, and Pakistan because 
of the potential miscoding of the auditor identification variable for these countries. 
17The over-representation of U.K. data in our sample may result in bias. In a robustness test, we remove the 
observations from the U.K. and repeat our analyses. Our results are intact after this exclusion, suggesting that our 
inference is not influenced by sample composition.  
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regulations. For example, auditors in Greece (a code law country) are required to assess whether 
financial reporting fairly presents economic realities in accordance with both accounting standards 
and commercial laws (including taxation law). In our sample, Portugal has the highest value of 
SEC and Denmark has the lowest value of SEC. In general, SEC is lower in Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as Australia, New Zealand, and the U.K. than in other countries, which is consistent with our 
expectation that firms in Anglo-Saxon countries are more transparent and thus less likely to receive 
modified audit opinions. We also show that common law jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, 
Singapore, and the U.K. have stronger investor protection regimes, as indicated by our composite 
investor protection regime measure (INVPRO). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the firm-level variables used in our 
analyses. The average MAO issued by Big 4 auditors is 0.172 (median = 0.000), suggesting that a 
considerable proportion of Big 4 clients receive modified audit opinions. The mean value and 
distribution of LMAO are similar to those of MAO. In our sample, Big 4 clients’ average return on 
assets (ROA) and stock return (RET) are negative. On average, these firms finance half of their 
capital from debt (LEV = 0.485). The average BETA is 0.597 in the Big 4 clients’ sample. 
In Table 2, we present the correlations among the key variables in this study. Secrecy 
culture (SEC) is negatively associated with anti-director provisions (ANTIDIR), common law 
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(UKLAW), and auditors’ litigation index (LITSTD). The correlation matrix also reveals that SEC is 
significantly positively associated with MAO, which is consistent with our first hypothesis. The 
table also shows that investor protection measures such as ANTIDIR, DISREQ, LITSTD, 
SECSTAFF, and INVPRO are negatively associated with MAO, suggesting that firms exposed to 
stronger investor protection regime and scrutinized by capable regulators have lower misstatement 
risks. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Association between Secrecy Culture and Auditors’ Propensity to Issue Modified Audit 
Opinions: Tests of Hypothesis H1 
Table 3 presents the results of Hypothesis H1 testing. Columns (1) and (2) provide the 
estimation results of Model (1) without and with the term of SEC respectively, using a full sample. 
Column (1) shows that Big N auditors are less likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients in 
common law countries (UKLAW) or countries with strong investor protection (ANTIDIR). 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., DeFond et al. 2002; Chen et al. 2010), we find that larger 
firms (LNASSET) and firms with higher risks (i.e., high BETA, LOSS, LEV or low QUICK, 
TURNOVER) are more likely to receive modified audit opinions. Column (2) of Table 3 shows 
that the coefficient of SEC is significantly positive (coefficient=0.008, P = 0.00). In terms of 
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economic significance, the result suggests that one standard deviation increase in SEC is associated 
with around 0.48 (0.008* Std SEC (55)) increase in probability of issuance of MAO. This result 
indicates that the likelihood of issuing a modified audit opinion is higher for clients domiciled in 
high secrecy culture societies than for other clients. The pseudo R-squares are all above 0.300, 
which are comparable to previous studies (e.g. Fung et al. 2016). The estimation results of control 
variables are generally consistent with the literature. In summary, the results support H1 and 
suggest that auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients domiciled in high 
secrecy culture societies than to other clients. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Joint Effect of Secrecy Culture and Investor Protection on Auditors’ Propensity to Issue 
Modified Audit Opinions: Tests of Hypothesis H2 
We test Hypothesis H2 by estimating Equation (2) with the inclusion of an interaction term 
between secrecy culture and investor protection (SEC* GOV). The regression results are reported 
in Table 4. We use various measures of investor protection, including anti-director provisions 
(ANTIDIR), accountants’ liability (LITSTD), disclosure requirement (DISREQ), monitoring 
resources (SECSTAFF), and a composite measure of investor protection (INVPRO). Consistent 
with the results in Table 3, secrecy (SEC) remains significantly positively associated with MAO 
for all measures of investor protection in Table 4. The interaction term (SEC*GOV) is significantly 
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and negatively associated with MAO, rejecting our second hypothesis (a null hypothesis) and 
suggesting a substitutional effect of SEC and GOV in driving MAO. To assess the overall effect of 
GOV on MAO, we multiply α3 (i.e., the coefficient of SEC*GOV which is -0.002 in Column 1) by 
the mean of SEC (64) and then plus the coefficient of GOV (0.049)18. The net value of these two 
terms remain negative (-0.002*64 + 0.049 = -0.079), suggesting that on average GOV is still 
negatively associated with MAO, consistent with the results in Table 3. The pseudo R-squares are 
all approximately 0.300. The results suggest that the association between secrecy culture and the 
likelihood of issuing modified audit opinions is less pronounced in countries with strong investor 
protection than in those with weak investor protection. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Country-level Analyses 
     Similar to a number of previous studies, our results so far are based on firm-level analyses (e.g. 
Lennox and Li 2012; Fung et al. 2016). The rationale for this approach is that MAO is engagement-
specific decision and thus should be analyzed based on firm level. Nevertheless, a potential bias 
may exist because our independent variable of interest is a country-level variable. To address this 
concern, we perform another set of analyses based on country-year level data19. For each country-
year, we obtain country-year MAO measure by taking average of MAO of all observations within 
a particular country-year. This approach generates 554 country-year observations. We then include 




= 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 × 𝑆𝐸𝐶 
19 We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. 
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country-level variables in Model (1) in our country-level regression model. To account for time 
variation, we control for year-fixed effect. We report our results in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
      The first column of the table presents the effect of secrecy culture on MAO based country-year 
data. Consistent with the results in Table 3, the association between SEC and MAO is significantly 
positive. The result of interaction effect (SEC*ANTIDIR) based on country-year level analyses 
(Column 2) is also consistent with that in Table 4. The R-squares in this table are comparable to 




DeFond et al. (2002) argue that financially distressed firms are more likely to receive 
modified opinions than their counterparts and suggest that analyzing audit opinions should be 
based on a sample consisting of financially distressed firms. We address this issue by analyzing 
data from loss firms only. Based on this sample, we run regressions based on Model (1) and Model 
(2). The results are presented in Table 6. 
Panel A presents the regression result for the effect of secrecy culture on modified audit 
opinions based on a sample that consists of financially distressed firms only (negative earnings). 
As shown in the panel, the coefficient of SEC is significantly positive (coefficient=0.004, P < 0.01). 
Consistent with the result in Table 3, this result indicates that the likelihood of issuing modified 
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audit opinions is higher for clients domiciled in societies with high secrecy culture than for other 
clients. 
Panel B presents the regression results for the joint effect of secrecy culture and investor 
protection on audit opinions based on a sample that consists of financially distressed firms only. 
The results consistently show that secrecy culture and investor protection substitute each other in 
driving modified audit opinions, consistent with the findings in preceding sections. The results in 
this table together with those in Table 4 reject our second hypothesis and support the substitution 
effect of secrecy culture and investor protection in affecting audit opinions. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Multinational Firms 
Multinational firms have several operations in different countries and thus are exposed to 
different cultures. As a result, these firms may be less likely to be affected by secrecy culture in 
their domiciled countries. Hope et al. (2008) show that the effect of secrecy on the choice of Big 
4 auditors is weaker in multinational firms than in non-multinational firms. However, an opposing 
view suggests that home-country institutions, both formal and informal, may affect multinational 
firms’ accounting practices (Shi et al. 2012). Thus, substantial reporting risks still exist in 
multinational firms domiciled in high secrecy cultures. Based on this argument, we expect that the 
effect of secrecy on audit opinions does not significantly vary between multinational firms and 
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non-multinational firms. We follow Hope et al. (2008) and define firms with more than 10% 
foreign tax to total tax as multinational firms (MNC). We run the regression based on an augmented 
specification of Model (1) by including an interaction item (SEC*MNC). We report the results in 
Table 7. In column (1), we report the results of a regression specification that includes 
multinationality (MNC). Result shows that MNC is negatively but not significantly associated with 
MAO, suggesting that multinational firms are less likely to receive modified audit opinions. In 
column (2), we report the results of a regression specification that includes a two-way interaction 
term (SEC*MNC). SEC*MNC is negative but not significant, suggesting that the relationship 
between SEC and MAO does not significantly vary with multinationality. Our results are consistent 
with the results of Shi et al. (2012), suggesting the power of culture in affecting mindsets in 
multinationals. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Addressing the Concurrent Effect of Managers’ Misstatement Incentives 
Because the issuance of MAO is jointly determined by financial reporting quality that is 
largely affected by managers’ misstatement incentives and auditor judgment, one concern arising 
is whether our result could be driven by managers’ incentives 20 . To disentangle these two 
                                                     
20 We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. 
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alternative explanations, we employ two approaches. One approach is to control for managers’ 
reporting incentives in our specifications. Prior studies show that managers use discretionary 
accruals to manipulate earnings, suggesting that accruals quality is a viable ex post measure of 
managers’ reporting incentives21 . Following Francis et al. (2013), we include signed accruals 
quality (ACCRUALS) as an additional control variable in our regression and report the results in 
Table 8.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Our results indicate that firms with high abnormal accruals are more likely to receive 
modified audit opinions, consistent with Francis and Krishnan (1999). More importantly, it shows 
that our results are unchanged after controlling for accruals quality. Our second approach is to use 
two-stage analysis. At the first stage, we use accruals quality and other firm-level variables as 
independent variables to predict MAO following Gul, Wu, and Yang (2013). The determinants in 
the first stage regression represents factors affecting managers’ earnings management incentives. 
The residual value derived from the first-stage regression represents MAO that is not explained by 
managerial incentives. We then use residual MAO as dependent variable and include SEC and other 
variables as independent variables in the second stage regression. The results still remain 
                                                     
21 Francis and Krishnan (2002) find that auditors are likely to issue modified audit opinions to firms with high 
abnormal accruals because of high reporting risks. 
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qualitatively unchanged. In sum, our results based on the above two approaches suggest that our 
findings are not driven by managers’ reporting incentives.   
 
Robustness Checks 
Alternative measure of secrecy by inclusion of masculinity scores 
Gray (1988) suggests a linkage between secrecy and masculinity. Based on this suggestion, 
Hope et al. (2008) construct an alternative measure of secrecy by including masculinity. This 
measure of secrecy is equal to the sum of uncertainty avoidance and power distance less 
individualism and plus masculinity (UA+PDI-IDV+MAS). We use the measure of secrecy as an 
alternative measure and find similar results. 
Alternative measure of secrecy based on GLOBE 
Our secrecy measure is based on Hofstede (2001). Despite the popularity of Hofstede’s 
(2001) measures of culture in empirical studies, the validity of the measure has been controversial 
in recent years. One notable argument is that Hofstede’s measure is outdated to some extent. To 
strengthen our results, we use culture measures based on the GLOBE (Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) survey (House et al. 2004) to construct an alternative 
measure of secrecy. Our results remain unchanged using this measure, suggesting that our results 
are not sensitive to culture measurement problems. 
Controlling for disclosure level 
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Previous studies show that secrecy culture is associated with lower corporate disclosure 
(Gray and Vint 1995; Wingate 1997). Higher transparency level is likely to affect MAO in two 
opposite ways. On the one hand, increased transparency facilitates more intensive monitoring from 
various parties, leading to higher risk exposures for the auditors. In response to greater risk 
exposures, auditors are likely to lower the threshold of issuing MAO. This view suggests a positive 
association between transparency and MAO. On the other hand, increased transparency indicates 
better reporting quality. Auditors thus are less likely to issue MAO to such clients. Because secrecy 
culture affects firms’ disclosure policy, one may argue that our empirical results are likely to be 
driven by transparency rather than secrecy effect. To address this concern, we conduct an additional 
test by explicitly controlling for firms’ disclosure level (LLSV 1997) and find that the results are 
unchanged.  
Addressing omitted correlated variable problems and country-level clustering 
We attempt to alleviate omitted correlated variable problems by controlling for several 
firm-specific characteristics in our analyses. Despite that, we cannot control for all the country-
level factors in our model. We also attempt to alleviate potential clustering problems by clustering 
at country level. This method is arguably the most conservative method of drawing inferences in 
an international setting. We repeat our regression analyses (based on Equations (1) and (2)) using 




Our sample consists of 33 countries, of which 10,426 observations are from the U.K. and 
some countries have extraordinarily high modified audit opinion ratios. Countries with high 
modified audit opinion ratios may have unique auditing environments (i.e., greater scopes for 
audits or lower thresholds for issuing modified audit opinions as required by local auditing 
regulations or standards). The composition of our sample may jeopardize our statistical inferences 
because these countries can be viewed as outliers to some extent. To address this issue, we repeat 
our analyses using two reduced samples: (1) a sample excluding countries that have extraordinarily 
high average modified audit opinions (including Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey), and (2) a sample 
excluding the U.K., the largest country in terms of number of observations in our sample. The 
untabulated results show that our findings remain unchanged, suggesting that our results are not 
influenced by sample composition. 
Limitations 
    Regardless of our efforts, our study still suffers from some limitations common to this type 
of study. First, our measures of firm-level variables (including MAO) may have errors because the 
definitions of accounting variables vary in different jurisdictions. Second, although we attempt to 
mitigate the omitted correlated variable problem, we acknowledge that this problem may still 
remain. This problem is rather common in international studies because it is not feasible to identify 
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and control all the potentially omitted correlated variables in one single study. Finally, our measure 
of secrecy, which relies on time-invariant culture measures (Hofstede 2001), has limited variation 
(DeFond et al. 2007). However, this problem is less likely to significantly affect our statistical 
inference because the evolution of culture is slow.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This study attempts to examine whether auditors respond to the audit risks inherent in 
secrecy cultures when giving opinions to clients domiciled in countries with secrecy cultures. 
Given that client firms in secrecy cultures are more likely to have lower corporate transparency 
and higher auditing risk, we predict that auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions to 
protect their valuable reputation capital. Our empirical results based on sample of international Big 
N auditors verify this prediction. We also explore the moderation effect of formal institutions 
pertaining to investor protection on the association between secrecy culture and auditors’ 
propensity to issue modified opinions. Our results indicate that the positive association between 
secrecy culture and auditors’ propensity to issue modified opinions is less pronounced in countries 
with strong investor protection than that in countries with weak protection. Consistent with the 
home-country institution effect, our further analyses reveal that the positive relationship between 




Our findings have many implications for research in both culture and auditing studies. 
Previous research reveals that firms in secrecy cultures are less likely to hire more competent 
auditors such as Big N auditors (Hope et al. 2008). Our study not only confirms secrecy hypothesis 
(Gray 1988) from auditors’ perspective but also suggests that auditors are likely to issue modified 
opinions to attenuate culture-driven potential auditing risks. Our study also reveals the moderating 
effect of formal institutions on the association between culture and auditors’ behaviors. Previous 
studies (e.g., Choi et al. 2008; Seetharaman et al. 2002) find that auditors consider formal 
institutions such as weak investor protection as risk factors. By showing the joint effect of formal 
and informal institutions, we complement and extend previous studies. Finally, the issue of whether 
and how auditors respond to reporting risks arising from international factors is also of interest to 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
 
Variables  Definitions 
Dependent variable 
MAO Audit opinion, a dummy variable coded as 1 for modified audit opinions and 0 otherwise. 
Country-level independent variables  
SEC 
Cultural secrecy, equals to UA + PDI – IDV                                  
Where UA is the uncertainty avoidance index, PDI is the power distance index, and IDV is the 
individualism index. All of these indices are from Hofstede (2001). 
ANTIDIR 
An assessment of anti-director rights, higher value indicating outside/minority shareholders are easier 
to exercise their rights against opportunistic behavior by managers and dominant owners. (LLSV 1997) 
DISREQ 
Index of disclosure requirement, measures the degree of information disclosure required form firms 
issuing securities through a prospectus (LLS2006) 
GOV Investor protection indices, including ANTIDIR, LITSTD, DISREQ, SECSTAFF, and INVPRO. 
INVPRO 
A composite investor protection index based on a factor analysis (principal components analysis) with 
varimax rotation of the variables ANTIDIR, LITSTD, DISREQ, and SECSTAFF. 
LITSTD 
Liability standard index measures the liability standard for investors to recover damages from issuers 
of securities, directors and auditors when there has been misleading disclosures in financial statements. 
(LLS2006) 
LNGDP The natural logarithm of GDP in a country in a given year. 
SECSTAFF 
The size of a country’s securities regulators’ staff based on data from year 2005, scaled by the country’s 
population in millions. (Jackson and Roe 2009) 
UKLAW 
A dummy variable, coded as 1 if a country’s legal origin is based on English common law, and 0 
otherwise. (LLSV 1997) 
Firm-level independent variables  
ACCRUALS 
Abnormal accruals, calculated following Francis et al. (2013). ABSACC is absolute value of 
ACCRUALS.  
ARINV Accounts receivable and inventory divided by total assets. 
BETA Slope coefficient from the market model estimating using daily return data over the year. 
LEV Firm’s leverage ratio, computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. 
LMAO Lagged audit opinions (MAO).  
LNASSET The natural logarithm of clients’ total assets. 
LOSS A dummy variable, coded 1 for loss firm and 0 otherwise. 
MNC An indicator variable, equals to 1 if a firm has more than 10% foreign tax to total tax, and 0 otherwise.  
QUICK 
Quick assets, including cash, short-term investments, and accounts receivable, divided by current 
liabilities. 
RET Cumulative market-adjusted stock returns for one year. 
ROA Return on asset, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
STDRET 
Standard deviation of the residuals from the market model estimated using daily return data over the 
year. 






Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Key variables mean value by country (N=49,697) 
Country N MAO SEC UKLAW ANTIDIR LITSTD SECSTAFF DISREQ INVPRO LNGDP 
Argentina 68 0.50 89 0 4 0.22 3.46 0.50 2.14 8.41 
Australia 4,712 0.14 -3 1 4 0.66 34.44 0.75 8.31 10.44 
Austria 361 0.09 26 0 2 0.11 9.97 0.25 2.66 10.55 
Belgium 405 0.40 84 0 0 0.44 13.76 0.42 2.90 10.50 
Brazil 1,326 0.47 107 0 3 0.33 2.68 0.25 1.62 8.53 
Canada 1,776 0.17 7 1 5 1.00 38.93 0.92 9.62 10.44 
Chile 437 0.25 126 0 5 0.33 9.93 0.58 3.75 8.99 
Colombia 41 0.39 134 0 3 0.11 3.94 0.42 1.86 8.25 
Denmark 658 0.06 -33 0 2 0.55 10.85 0.58 3.05 10.75 
Finland 868 0.05 29 0 3 0.66 11.23 0.50 3.43 10.53 
France 1,680 0.63 83 0 3 0.22 5.91 0.75 2.38 10.42 
Germany 2,196 0.08 33 0 1 0.00 4.43 0.42 1.31 10.47 
Greece 317 0.28 137 0 2 0.50 12.16 0.33 3.20 9.97 
Hong Kong SAR 
Chin 
5,907 0.06 72 1 5 0.66 59.59 0.92 13.53 10.19 
Indonesia 555 0.53 112 0 2 0.66 1.97 0.50 1.33 7.11 
Ireland 558 0.27 -7 1 4 0.44 23.32 0.67 6.08 10.66 
Israel 290 0.52 40 1 3 0.66 18.78 0.67 4.94 9.89 
Italy 613 0.42 49 0 1 0.22 7.25 0.67 1.99 10.30 
Malaysia 5,076 0.30 114 1 4 0.66 22.38 0.92 6.04 8.61 
Mexico 392 0.31 133 0 1 0.11 5.19 0.58 1.54 8.98 
Netherlands 842 0.08 11 0 2 0.89 23.53 0.50 5.55 10.58 
New Zealand 391 0.04 -8 1 4 0.44 8.95 0.67 3.31 10.21 
Norway 1,007 0.10 12 0 4 0.39 20.78 0.58 5.55 11.07 
Peru 98 0.23 135 0 3 0.66 5.32 0.33 2.24 7.98 
Philippines 251 0.25 106 0 3 1.00 4.29 0.83 2.29 7.09 
Portugal 217 0.35 140 0 3 0.66 14.50 0.42 4.04 9.82 
Singapore 3,243 0.09 62 1 4 0.66 77.74 1.00 16.75 10.24 
Spain 358 0.38 92 0 4 0.66 8.50 0.50 3.22 10.15 
Sweden 1,496 0.04 -11 0 3 0.28 7.19 0.58 2.59 10.61 
Switzerland 1,586 0.08 24 0 2 0.44 8.87 0.67 2.67 10.88 
Thailand 1,139 0.42 108 1 2 0.22 6.52 0.92 2.24 7.92 
Turkey 407 0.57 114 0 2 0.22 6.17 0.50 2.04 8.86 





Panel B: Full sample descriptive statistics (N=49,697) 
 
Variable Mean STD P25 Median P75 
MAO 0.172 0.377 0 0 0 
LMAO 0.163 0.370 0 0 0 
QUICK 1.945 2.981 0.756 1.098 1.773 
ARINV 0.315 0.206 0.142 0.297 0.460 
LEV 0.485 0.226 0.321 0.495 0.641 
TURNOVER 0.949 0.731 0.427 0.818 1.278 
ROA -0.006 0.222 -0.007 0.037 0.077 
LOSS 0.265 0.441 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LNASSET 5.686 1.979 4.310 5.534 6.999 
RET -0.081 0.294 -0.288 -0.073 0.127 
BETA 0.597 0.614 0.129 0.477 0.898 
STDRET 0.023 0.009 0.017 0.022 0.029 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the sample used in this study. The Appendix contains the definitions of all the variables. Panel A of this table presents the country-level summary statistics 




Table 2: Correlations of the Key Variables 
 
  SEC UKLAW ANTIDIR LITSTD SECSTAFF DISREQ INVPRO LNGDP 
UKLAW -0.171***               
 0.00        
ANTIDIR -0.270*** 0.764***       
 0.00 0.00       
LITSTD -0.190*** 0.630*** 0.686***      
 0.00 0.00 0.00      
SECSTAFF 0.079*** 0.582*** 0.498*** 0.505***     
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
DISREQ 0.003 0.829*** 0.671*** 0.580*** 0.646***    
 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
INVPRO 0.047*** 0.633*** 0.575*** 0.555*** 0.996*** 0.687***   
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
LNGDP -0.748*** -0.029*** 0.153*** 0.035*** 0.182*** -0.034*** 0.184***  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
MAO 0.267*** -0.133*** -0.165*** -0.133*** -0.162*** -0.092*** -0.169*** -0.235*** 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Notes: The table presents correlations of the key variable in our study.  The Appendix 1 contains the definitions of all the variables. 







Table 3: The Effect of Secrecy Culture on Audit Opinion 
 
Dep. Var. = Prob (MAO=1)  (1)  (2) 
  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value 
SEC    0.008*** 0.00 
UKLAW -0.248*** 0.00  -0.083 0.10 
ANTIDIR -0.054*** 0.00  -0.069*** 0.00 
LNGDP -0.558*** 0.00  -0.239*** 0.00 
LMAO 2.524*** 0.00  2.473*** 0.00 
QUICK -0.022*** 0.00  -0.017** 0.02 
ARINV 0.057 0.62  -0.162 0.15 
LEV 1.051*** 0.00  1.118*** 0.00 
TURNOVER -0.247*** 0.00  -0.178*** 0.00 
ROA -1.039*** 0.00  -1.098*** 0.00 
LOSS 0.326*** 0.00  0.366*** 0.00 
LNASSET 0.029** 0.02  0.024* 0.06 
RET -0.061 0.27  -0.060 0.29 
BETA 0.047* 0.05  -0.014 0.59 
STDRET 8.326*** 0.00  8.845*** 0.00 
YEAR YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES  
      
N 49,697   49,697  
Pseudo R2 0.3236   0.3300  
 
Notes: The table reports empirical results of the relationship between secrecy culture and modified audit opinion. The dependent 
variable (MAO) is probability of issuing modified opinions. SEC is a measure of cultural secrecy, which equals to UA + PDI - 
IDV. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. We also control for year 
fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for variations at firm-level. ***, **, * indicate significant level 









Table 4: The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Culture on Audit Opinion 
Dep. Var. = 
Prob(MAO=1) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
GOV=ANTIDIR   GOV=LITSTD   GOV=DISREQ   GOV=SECSTAFF   GOV=INVPRO 
Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value 
SEC 0.016*** 0.00   0.018*** 0.00   0.011*** 0.00   0.024*** 0.00   0.025*** 0.00 
LMAO 2.455*** 0.00  2.437*** 0.00  2.471*** 0.00  2.363*** 0.00  2.367*** 0.00 
UKLAW -0.123** 0.02  -0.131*** 0.00  -0.486*** 0.00  0.528*** 0.00  0.537*** 0.00 
GOV 0.049* 0.06  0.593*** 0.00  1.101*** 0.00  0.007** 0.01  0.017 0.20 
SEC*GOV -0.002*** 0.00  -0.018*** 0.00  -0.005** 0.02  -0.001*** 0.00  -0.002*** 0.00 
LNGDP -0.195*** 0.00  -0.243*** 0.00  -0.295*** 0.00  0.222*** 0.00  0.200*** 0.00 
QUICK -0.018** 0.01  -0.019** 0.01  -0.017** 0.02  -0.024*** 0.00  -0.023*** 0.00 
ARINV -0.125 0.27  -0.112 0.33  -0.178 0.12  -0.054 0.64  -0.063 0.59 
LEV 1.095*** 0.00  1.174*** 0.00  1.130*** 0.00  1.078*** 0.00  1.069*** 0.00 
TURNOVER -0.189*** 0.00  -0.200*** 0.00  -0.169*** 0.00  -0.189*** 0.00  -0.193*** 0.00 
ROA -1.079*** 0.00  -1.023*** 0.00  -1.086*** 0.00  -0.987*** 0.00  -0.998*** 0.00 
LOSS 0.355*** 0.00  0.348*** 0.00  0.372*** 0.00  0.322*** 0.00  0.320*** 0.00 
LNASSET 0.015 0.25  -0.001 0.94  0.020 0.12  0.008 0.52  0.007 0.57 
RET -0.068 0.23  -0.067 0.23  -0.056 0.32  -0.119** 0.04  -0.118** 0.04 
BETA 0.021 0.42  0.051** 0.04  -0.005 0.86  0.034 0.19  0.040 0.12 
STDRET 8.558*** 0.00  8.386*** 0.00  8.974*** 0.00  13.225*** 0.00  13.161*** 0.00 
YEAR YES   YES   YES   YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES   YES   YES   YES  
               
N 49,697   49,697   49,697   49,697   49,697  
Pseudo R2 0.3312     0.3335     0.3303     0.3410     0.3403   
Notes: The table reports the results of the effect of secrecy culture and investor protection on modified audit opinion. The dependent variable is probability of issuing modified opinions. GOV measures 
strength of formal institutions, including ANTIDIR, LITSTD, DISREQ, SECSTAFF and INVPRO. High ANTIDIR indicates that outside/minority shareholders are easier to exercise their rights against 
opportunistic behavior by managers and dominant owners. LITSTD measures the liability standard for investors to recover damages from issuers of securities, directors and auditors when there has been 
misleading disclosures in financial statements. DISREQ is a measure of disclosure requirement from LLSV (2006). SECSTAFF is the size of a country’s securities regulators’ staff based on data 
from year 2005, scaled by a country’s population in millions (Jackson and Roe 2009). INVPRO is a composite investor protection measure based on a factor analysis to extract the commonality 
among ANTIDIR, LITSTD, DISREQ, and SECSTAFF. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. We also control for year fixed effect. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The 
standard errors are clustered by firm to account for variations at firm-level.  ***, **, * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5: Regression Results based on Country-Years 
 
 (1)  (2) 
Dep. Var. = MAO Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value 
SEC 0.000*** 0.00  0.002*** 0.00 
UKLAW 0.031 0.16  0.012 0.61 
ANTIDIR -0.019** 0.02  0.003 0.83 
SEC*ANTIDIR    -0.001** 0.04 
LNGDP -0.035*** 0.00  -0.035*** 0.00 
YEAR YES   YES  
      
N 554   554  
R2 0.3466     0.3520   
 
This table reports the regression results based on country-year data. The dependent variable is country-year mean 
MAO. Others are the same as those in Table 4. We account for year variation by controlling for year fixed effect in 























Table 6: Financially-Distressed Firms Subsample 
Panel A: The Effect of Secrecy Culture on Audit Opinion 
 
Dep. Var. = Prob ( MAO=1) 
  Coefficient P-Value 
SEC 0.004*** 0.00 
LMAO 2.280*** 0.00 
UKLAW 0.147 0.14 
ANTIDIR -0.125*** 0.00 
LNGDP -0.255*** 0.00 
QUICK -0.029*** 0.00 
ARINV -0.253 0.15 
LEV 1.459*** 0.00 
TURNOVER -0.232*** 0.00 
ROA -0.815*** 0.00 
LNASSET -0.027 0.17 
RET -0.487*** 0.00 
BETA 0.014 0.69 
STDRET 11.831*** 0.00 
YEAR YES  
INDUSTRY YES  
   
N 13,177  



















(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
GOV=ANTIDIR   GOV=LITSTD   GOV=DISREQ   GOV=SECSTAFF   GOV= INVPRO 
Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value 
SEC 0.011*** 0.00  0.012*** 0.00  0.009*** 0.00  0.016*** 0.00  0.017*** 0.00 
LMAO 2.268*** 0.00  2.262*** 0.00  2.287*** 0.00  2.230*** 0.00  2.231*** 0.00 
UKLAW 0.128 0.20  -0.070 0.40  -0.119 0.36  0.231** 0.02  0.244** 0.03 
GOV -0.045 0.31  0.422* 0.06  0.496 0.25  0.012** 0.01  0.045** 0.03 
SEC*GOV -0.002*** 0.00  -0.015*** 0.00  -0.008** 0.03  -0.001*** 0.00  -0.002*** 0.00 
LNGDP -0.210*** 0.00  -0.284*** 0.00  -0.284*** 0.00  0.016 0.83  0.011 0.88 
QUICK -0.030*** 0.00  -0.031*** 0.00  -0.030*** 0.00  -0.034*** 0.00  -0.034*** 0.00 
ARINV -0.236 0.18  -0.201 0.26  -0.220 0.21  -0.167 0.35  -0.178 0.32 
LEV 1.443*** 0.00  1.473*** 0.00  1.451*** 0.00  1.457*** 0.00  1.451*** 0.00 
TURNOVER -0.234*** 0.00  -0.246*** 0.00  -0.230*** 0.00  -0.231*** 0.00  -0.232*** 0.00 
ROA -0.803*** 0.00  -0.761*** 0.00  -0.782*** 0.00  -0.758*** 0.00  -0.759*** 0.00 
LNASSET -0.034* 0.08  -0.049** 0.01  -0.039* 0.05  -0.043** 0.03  -0.045** 0.02 
RET -0.491*** 0.00  -0.483*** 0.00  -0.488*** 0.00  -0.497*** 0.00  -0.498*** 0.00 
BETA 0.036 0.33  0.054 0.13  0.044 0.22  0.0349 0.33  0.0425 0.24 
STDRET 12.506*** 0.00  12.154*** 0.00  11.590*** 0.00  11.858*** 0.00  12.348*** 0.00 
YEAR YES   YES   YES   YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES   YES   YES   YES  
               
N 13,177   13,177   13,177   13,177   13,177  
Pseudo  R2 0.2828     0.2892     0.2874     0.2926     0.2924   
Notes: The table reports empirical results of testing H1 and H2 based on financial-distressed firms only. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. We also control for year fixed effect.  All 




Table 7: The Effect of Secrecy Culture on Audit Opinion: The Role of Multinationality 
 
Dep. Var. = Prob (MAO=1) (1)   (2) 
  Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value 
SEC 0.008*** 0.00  0.009*** 0.00 
LMAO 2.473*** 0.00  2.472*** 0.00 
UKLAW -0.079 0.10  -0.078 0.10 
ANTIDIR -0.067*** 0.00  -0.068*** 0.00 
MNC -0.056 0.25  -0.003 0.96 
SEC*MNC    -0.001 0.21 
LNGDP -0.237*** 0.00  -0.231*** 0.00 
QUICK -0.017** 0.01  -0.017** 0.01 
ARINV -0.156 0.13  -0.160 0.12 
LEV 1.119*** 0.00  1.116*** 0.00 
TURNOVER -0.178*** 0.00  -0.178*** 0.00 
ROA -1.097*** 0.00  -1.100*** 0.00 
LOSS 0.366*** 0.00  0.365*** 0.00 
LNASSET 0.027** 0.01  0.025** 0.02 
RET -0.060 0.27  -0.061 0.26 
BETA -0.014 0.57  -0.013 0.60 
STDRET 8.910*** 0.00  8.987*** 0.00 
YEAR YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES  
      
N 49,697   49,697  
Pseudo  R2 0.3300     0.3310   
 
Notes: The table presents empirical results testing the role of multinationality (MNC) on the relationship between cultural secrecy 
and audit opinion. In column (1), we report the results based on regression specification that includes multinationality (MNC). In 
column (2), we report the results based on regression specification that includes an interaction term (SEC* MNC). Industry fixed 
effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. We also control for year fixed effect. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. The standard 




















Table 8: Addressing the Concurrent Effect of Managers’ Misstatement Incentives 
Panel A: Controlling for Accruals Quality 
Dep. Var. = Prob ( MAO=1)  (1) 
  Coefficient P-Value 
SEC 0.008*** 0.00 
LMAO 2.464*** 0.00 
UKLAW -0.082 0.12 
ANTIDIR -0.079*** 0.00 
ACCRUALS 0.248* 0.05 
LNGDP -0.264*** 0.00 
QUICK -0.016** 0.03 
ARINV -0.208* 0.08 
LEV 1.183*** 0.00 
TURNOVER -0.173*** 0.00 
ROA -1.142*** 0.00 
LOSS 0.390*** 0.00 
LNASSET 0.028** 0.04 
RET -0.072 0.22 
BETA -0.003 0.91 
STDRET 8.468** 0.00 
YEAR YES  
INDUSTRY YES  
   
N 47,716  
















Panel B: Addressing the Effect of Managers’ Misstatement Incentives using Two-stage 
Analysis 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Dep. Var= Prob (MAO=1)   Abnormal MAO  
  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value 
SEC    0.001*** 0.00 
LMAO    0.462*** 0.00 
UKLAW    -0.025*** 0.00 
ANTIDIR    -0.003 0.23 
LNGDP    -0.045*** 0.00 
QUICK 0.020*** 0.00  -0.021*** 0.00 
ARINV -0.088* 0.08  0.075*** 0.00 
LEV -0.927*** 0.00  1.059*** 0.00 
TURNOVER 0.264*** 0.00  -0.278*** 0.00 
ROA 0.425*** 0.00  -0.566*** 0.00 
LOSS -0.153*** 0.00  0.185*** 0.00 
LNASSET 0.017*** 0.00  -0.016** 0.00 
ABSACC -0.035 0.64    
RET    -0.005 0.36 
BETA    -0.004 0.17 
STDRET    0.245 0.30 
YEAR YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES  
      
N 47,716   47,716  
R2/ Pseudo  R2 0.2067   0.3035  
 
Notes: Panel A of this table presents the result of the effect of secrecy culture on modified audit opinion after 
controlling for accruals quality. We measure accruals quality (ACCRUALS) following Francis et al. (2013). Panel B 
presents the results using two-stage analysis to address the effect of managerial incentives. In the first stage MAO 
prediction model, we include accruals quality (ABSACC) and other firm-level variables as independent variables 
following Gul et al. (2013). Column (1) reports the first stage regression result. The residual value derived from the 
first-stage regression result represents MAO that is not explained by managerial incentives. We then use residual MAO 
as dependent variable and include SEC and other independent variables in the second stage regression. Column (2) 
reports the result. *, ** and *** indicate the coefficients are statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
